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This paper discusses the design of tax systems in developing countries, with particular
emphasis on low-income countries. It outlines the directions of reform that many low-
income countries have followed, often on the advice of the IMF or the World Bank, and
considers whether they are justified in terms of theory and the practical constraints in
low-income countries. Discussion of tax theory shows that there are sound reasons for
much of the tax reform advice that is given, but it provides rather little support for the
policy of full tax neutrality that is frequently recommended for developing countries.
However, there are also serious political economy arguments against tax non-
uniformity. The paper therefore concludes that the design of tax policy must also
consider the strength of institutions and the rule of law.
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1 Introduction
The purpose of this paper is to discuss the design of tax systems in developing
countries, with particular emphasis on low-income countries. It outlines the directions
of reform that many low-income countries have followed, often on the advice of the
IMF or the World Bank, and considers whether they are justified in terms of theory and
the practical constraints in low-income countries. These issues are important because, as
discussed below, low-income countries are having great difficulties in raising money to
finance important development expenditure. In addition, Chu, Davoodi and Gupta
(2000) suggest that developing countries have not been as successful as developed
countries in designing progressive tax structures, which would place a smaller burden
on the poorest inhabitants.
The relevant tax theory has not changed significantly since the comprehensive survey of
Burgess and Stern (1993). In view of this, the contribution of this paper lies in applying
the theory to the particular features of low-income countries. In particular, it pays
greater attention to conclusions that can be drawn from optimal tax models that
incorporate some of the features that Burgess and Stern identify as characteristic of
many developing countries. This paper is also more theoretically oriented than the
recent paper by Tanzi and Zee (2000), which lays out a number of useful tax policy
recommendations for developing countries, based on IMF country experience.
The emphasis in the paper is on the choice of tax rates and bases, without much regard
to the nature of the institutions involved. It therefore does not address the growing view
that many poor countries need to improve the quality of their tax administrations, and
the legitimacy of government institutions more generally, if taxes are to be levied
effectively (see DFID (2001)). It also does not consider the level of government that
sets tax rates, collects taxes or ultimately receives the revenue. It therefore does not
discuss fiscal federalism, which is of considerable importance for many developing
countries and has been the subject of an extensive literature (see, for example, Bird and
Vaillancourt (1998)). Nonetheless, there is some discussion of taxes that are mainly
used by sub-central levels of government, such as property taxes.
Section 2 briefly describes the main features of tax systems in low-income countries and
compares them to tax systems in developed countries. Section 3 describes the directions
of reforms, which have frequently been undertaken in the context of structural
adjustment programmes. Section 4 looks in more depth at the theoretical basis for these
reforms and other features that are particularly important for low-income countries.
Section 5 presents some conclusions.
2 Revenue patterns
Table 1 presents the latest available data for the revenue position and tax mix for a
selection of low-income countries (as defined by the World Bank). The selection is
based purely on the availability of recent data in the World Bank database, which
originally came from the IMF’s Government Finance Statistics Yearbook.2
The first two columns of table 1 report the share of revenue in GDP and the budget
deficit for 1998. The share of revenue in GDP shows a very wide variation, from 5.3%
in the Democratic Republic of Congo to 44.7% in Lesotho. It is only in Lesotho that the
share of revenue in GDP exceeds that for the OECD, and most low-income countries
have a revenue share that is less than half that in the industrialised world. However, it
should be noted that the figures for low-income countries relate only to central
government revenues, while those for the OECD include revenues for sub-central levels
of government (which make up about 20% of total revenues). The budget deficits also
show a wide range, from 0.9% in Kenya and Myanmar to 10.8% in Mongolia, but it is
striking that none of them show a budget surplus.1 These figures show the need for low-
income countries to raise more revenue, to both reduce their budget deficits and increase
the resources that they can use to fight poverty. This means that tax policy is of
fundamental importance in order to raise additional revenues in a way that does not
worsen poverty or slow economic growth.
The remaining columns of table 1 report the composition of government revenue in
1997. In comparison with the OECD countries, the most striking differences are the low
usage of social security taxes (where the largest values are from previously centrally
planned economies), the high revenue from trade taxes (which are so small in
industrialised countries that the OECD does not compute an average) and the high
levels of non-tax revenues. There is also a generally lower share of income tax in total
revenue. Tanzi and Zee (2000) show that developing countries tend to collect a
substantially higher share of their income tax revenue from companies than individuals,
and so it is likely that it is personal income tax that is mainly responsible for this low
share.
These general differences in revenue shares in comparison with industrialised countries
should not mask the substantial differences between low-income countries. There is a
particularly wide range in non-tax revenue, in part because of the large differences in
the value of mineral deposits between countries.
The differences in revenue patterns between low-income countries and the industrialised
world are easy to explain in terms of administrative convenience. The high proportion
of the workforce employed by well-established companies facilitates the heavy reliance
placed on social security taxes in industrialised countries and personal income taxes. In
contrast, the low-income countries' reliance on international trade taxes reflects the
relative ease of observing and valuing goods as they cross international frontiers, while
the greater reliance on company income tax reflects the greater ease of collecting taxes
from companies than individuals. However, there are other, non-administrative forces at
work. The high non-tax revenue in some countries results from mineral deposits, while
trade taxes were often introduced as part of a strategy of import substitution. Also, the
use of export taxes in addition to import duties by some developing countries reflects in
part their export of agricultural products in which they have some monopoly power,
although this has fallen recently for most countries as explained in the next section.
1 If countries are aiming to achieve (near) budget balance over the medium-term, it should be expected
that they would run budget surpluses in some years.3
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Azerbaijan 19.3 3.9 20 23 41 8 2 5
Burundi 13.7 5.5 22 8 45 16 2 7
Cameroon n.a. n.a. 17 0 25 28 3 27
Congo, Dem. Rep. 5.3 6.5 25 0 18 28 9 20
Congo, Rep. 29.4 8.6 905907 7
Côte d’Ivoire 21.6 1.3 20 6 17 50 3 4
Georgia 5.6 2.5 9 0 55 13 0 22
India 11.6 5.2 27 0 27 22 0 25
Indonesia 16.8 2.4 57 3 28 3 1 9
Kenya 26.2 0.9 34 0 37 15 1 14
Lesotho 44.7 3.7 15 0 12 52 0 21
Madagascar 8.7 1.3 18 0 24 53 2 2
Mongolia 19.5 10.8 26 19 28 5 1 20
Myanmar 7.8 0.9 18 0 30 10 0 42
Nepal 10.6 4.7 13 0 37 28 4 16
Nicaragua n.a. n.a. 11 13 43 21 6 6
Pakistan 15.9 6.3 21 0 29 22 8 19
Sierra Leone 10.2 5.8 17 0 33 46 0 3
Vietnam 18.2 1.1 22 0 33 22 10 14
Y e m e n , R e p .3 6 . 8 2 . 3 1 6 07926 6
Zimbabwe 29.4 5.0 43 0 24 20 2 10
OECD Average 43.5 n.a. 31 22 28 n.a. 6 13
Source: World Bank, World Development Indicators,O E C DRevenue Statistics, and author’s calculations.
Note: First two columns contain data for 1998 (1997 for the OECD), and the remaining columns for 1997.
3 Directions of reforms
Structural adjustment programmes have been widespread since the IMF introduced its
Extended Fund Facility (EFF) in 1974, followed by its Structural Adjustment Facility
(SAF) in 1986 and its Enhanced Structural Adjustment Facility (ESAF) in 1987 and
have been a major force in determining the direction of tax reforms in low-income
countries. Since 1987, the IMF has approved an average of approximately ten new
programmes per year under these facilities, and there is no sign of this rate declining. In
1999, the IMF replaced the ESAF with the Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility4
(PRGF) for low-income countries.2 As the name suggests, this facility puts a greater
emphasis on poverty reduction. It also provides for greater flexibility of in its fiscal
targets and greater national ‘ownership’ of policy (see Adam and Bevan (2001)).
For many countries, the structural adjustment programmes have arisen out of economic
crises, normally involving substantial government budget deficits and balance of
payments difficulties. In these circumstances, the government will approach the IMF
and possibly the World Bank to request loans. The loans that are granted are subject to
the government following particular economic policies that are expected to correct the
major imbalances in the economy. It is this set of economic policies that constitutes the
structural adjustment programme. ESAF conditionality was widely regarded as
excessively rigid and showing insufficient concern for the poor. The recent moves to
greater flexibility and concern for poverty should permit countries to have greater
freedom in the taxes that they choose provided that they meet the agreed target for the
fiscal deficit.
Most programmes involve two distinct components. The first is the stabilisation phase,
in which the imbalances are reduced. This is usually achieved by reductions in
government expenditure and controls on credit creation. However, increases in tax
revenue can also play a role in achieving macroeconomic stability. Table 2 shows that
many low-income countries have reduced their budget deficits during the 1990s,
although table 1 shows that some remain high. It is interesting to note that this did not
always involve an increase in the revenue share of GDP, implying that expenditures
must have been cut. As such expenditure cuts probably reduced services to the poor
and/or infrastructure investments that are necessary for growth, it is arguable that
stabilisation should have concentrated more on raising revenue than cutting expenditure.
The dangers of cutting expenditures through measures such as cash budgeting are
discussed in Adam and Bevan (2001).
The second component is the structural adjustment phase, in which the basic structure of
the economy is altered in an attempt to improve the long-term performance of the
economy. This second phase, the real structural adjustment, can itself often be divided
into two parts: (i) policies to increase the supply of tradable goods (both exports and
import substitutes) and (ii) policies to reduce government intervention and improve
efficiency in the economy as a whole. The tax element of these policies has generally
involved a movement towards “neutrality”, so that the tax system has a smaller effect on
the allocation of resources in the economy.
As taxes on international trade are seen as having a major distortionary effect, countries
are frequently advised to reduce the rates of import duties and to make them more
uniform. There is also advice to reduce and often eliminate export taxes because they
discourage exports. These policy recommendations often encounter considerable
opposition. It can be argued that export taxes exploit monopoly power in primary export
markets, but this should be viewed with some suspicion because of the threat of new
entrants into the market if world prices rise too high. The reduction of import duties
often runs into serious political opposition, with the domestic producers of protected
goods using the threat of large-scale unemployment as a consequence of trade
liberalisation. However, trade liberalisation normally increases export potential and
2 The information in the paragraph is taken from IMF (2001).5
opens up new job opportunities, so a well-phased reduction in protection can improve
social welfare considerably. Reductions in trade taxes can also lead to improvements in
tax compliance, and so not reduce revenue by as much as might be expected. Table 2
shows that many low-income countries have, indeed, succeeded in reducing their
dependence on trade taxes, although the absolute amounts of revenues from these
sources may have increased as a result of growth, improved compliance or improved
administration.
Any lost revenue from reducing trade taxes must be balanced by increases in tax
revenue elsewhere. A common recommendation is to increase the revenue from
domestic commodity taxes, which are less distortionary than trade taxes. Indeed, the
replacement of an import duty on a consumer good by a domestic sales tax at the same
rate will yield at least as much revenue as before without raising prices. This is because
the base of the tax is broadened to include domestic production as well as imports
without increasing marginal cost. More generally, a good deal of additional revenue
can be obtained by broadening the base of domestic sales taxes, which often have large
numbers of special exemptions. This broadening of the sales tax base is, in itself, a
move towards tax neutrality because it is subjecting a wider range of goods to the same
rate of tax. The distributional arguments for and against such exemptions, or reduced
rates, are discussed in the next section. Table 2 shows that several low-income countries
have increased the revenue share of sales taxes (including both general sales taxes and
domestic excise duties). However, several have reduced the revenue share of such taxes,
increasing instead the share of income taxes and/or the share of non-tax revenue.
VAT is often recommended as a replacement for existing commodity taxes for three
reasons: it broadens the tax base by including services, which have usually not been
taxed before; it eliminates the cascading involved in turnover taxes and some
manufacturers’ sales tax systems; and its self-enforcing mechanism means that
compliance is higher. However, VAT does have problems if introduced into some low-
income countries. It is a difficult tax to administer, for both the taxpayer and the tax
authorities. This has ruled it out as a possibility in some countries, and a wish to reduce
its administrative complexity has usually led to advice that only a single rate of VAT
should be used, the only exception being zero-rating for exports. Such a single rate VAT
does not distort consumer choice between alternative goods, and so is consistent with
the idea of tax neutrality. The only non-uniformity in domestic commodity taxes would
then be the excises on alcohol, tobacco and petrol and the exemptions from VAT that
are granted to some traders mainly for reasons of administrative convenience. The
excises on alcohol, tobacco and petrol are seen as justified non-neutralities, either
because of the external costs imposed by their consumption, or because their low price
elasticity enables large amounts of revenue to be collected with little distortionary cost.
However, governments should also be concerned about the distributional impact of
these taxes, especially on petrol as high taxation can increase the cost of rural transport
and so harm the poor.6
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Burundi -4.5 2.2 3 7 20 -24 -6 1
Cameroon n.a. n.a. -5 -8 7 -10 -2 19
Congo, Dem. Rep. -4.8 -5.7 -5 -2 6 -10 4 8
Congo, Rep. 6.9 -5.5 -40 -4 -3 -4 -3 53
Côte d’Ivoire -0.4 -1.6 7 0 -8 7 -3 -4
India -0.7 -2.3 9 0 -15 0 -1 8
Indonesia -2.0 2.8 -21 3 19 -4 0 4
Kenya 3.8 -2.9 5 0 -2 -4 0 1
L e s o t h o 5 . 7 2 . 7 202- 9 - 2 7
Madagascar -2.8 0.4 1 -11 -15 25 -1 0
Myanmar -2.7 -4.2 15 0 -12 -5 0 2
Nepal 2.2 -2.1 700- 5 - 4 0
Nicaragua n.a. n.a. 346- 4 - 2 - 4
Pakistan -3.2 0.9 7 0 -5 -12 8 1
Sierra Leone 6.1 4.0 -5 0 17 -4 -2 -7
Zimbabwe 5.3 -0.3 -3 0 -4 16 1 -10
Source: World Bank, World Development Indicators and author’s calculations.
Note: First two columns contain changes from 1990 to 1998, remaining columns report changes from 1980 to 1997.
The traditional argument against such a single rate VAT is its regressivity. In some
developed countries, such as the U.K., this is offset by applying a lower rate or even a
zero rate to such items as food and children's clothing. However, this is typically not
advised for developing countries because of administrative problems, especially if VAT
refunds have to be made to a large number of traders. Instead, an exemption of small-
scale agriculture can be used to give favourable treatment to the food consumed mainly
by the poor, as has been done in Uganda and Zambia (DFID, 2001). This has the added
benefit of eliminating the administrative costs of assessing large numbers of small
farmers for VAT.
The reforms to direct taxes are usually less far-reaching. There is a lack of scope for a
mass system of personal income taxes in many low-income countries because such a
high proportion of the population is extremely poor. However, in those countries at a
sufficiently high level of development to operate a significant personal income tax
system there is often scope for reducing exemptions (broadening the base and
promoting neutrality again) and simplifying the rate structure in much the same way as
has been happening in industrialised countries. This can often improve equality as the
exemptions usually relate to items that are not relevant to the poor. Similar
modifications, together with improvements in accounting practices, have also often been7
recommended for company taxation. There has been a general tendency to encourage
lowering the rates of both personal and corporate income taxes, because of concerns
over tax evasion and disincentives. However, there is little evidence on the effects of
rate reductions on both of these concerns, and it is important to remember that personal
income taxes are usually the only part of the tax system that is significantly
redistributive. Thus the choice of income tax rates is difficult with the current lack of
information.
A final aspect of tax reforms that is worth mentioning here has not been the result of
domestic political pressure rather than the conditionality imposed by the IMF or the
World Bank. The unpopularity of property taxes has prompted local governments in
many countries to look for other sources of revenue,3 and these have frequently been in
the form of service charges. The attraction of service charges is that the public sees
them as directly related to the service they receive, and so are less likely to complain
about them. For example, if the local government makes charges for collecting
unusually large quantities of garbage, it is seen as quite reasonable that they should
charge a fee. In many countries, charges had been made for services for a long time but
were not sufficient to cover the costs. The move towards service charges has then
simply been a matter of raising the fees to cover the full cost. Obviously, service
charges cannot be levied on all services. In many countries, basic education is provided
free of charge. Also, some services are true public goods, such as street lighting, and
cannot be charged for.
The setting or raising of service charges for local government services can be criticized
for several reasons. First, many of the services provided, such as adult education or
recreational facilities, are seen as “merit goods” whose use is beneficial to society. The
setting or raising of charges for these services discourages their use, and this can be seen
as harmful. Second, the setting or raising of charges makes it very difficult for poor
people to make use of these services, and adds to the exclusion of such people from
society. Third, even if poorer households use little of the service, the sharp and sudden
increases in prices that sometimes accompany stabilization can cause considerable
distress. Finally, it is important that the charging of service fees should not take place in
an institutional setting that pressures each sector to cover its costs. Funding from
taxation should be accompanied by reasonable service charges, not replaced by
excessive charges.
Closely related to the idea of service charges is the idea of benefit taxation: to directly
tax the people who benefit from local government expenditure. For example, many
publicly provided services in urban areas, such as the provision of roads and drainage,
increase the value of private land. Benefit taxation involves taxing some of that
increased value to pay for the services. The design of these taxes requires detailed
knowledge of each individual project and involves considerable skill. An example of a
system of benefit taxation that has worked well is provided by the “valorization” tax in
Colombia (described in Bird, 1992), which has been used to finance a considerable part
of public investment in the city of Medellin. A valorization tax is a tax on the increase
in the value of land and buildings that results from improved public services.
3 Kelly (1999) comments on the political difficulties of collecting revenues through property taxes and
reports that the ratio of property tax revenue to GDP in Kenya fell from 0.37 percent in 1990/1 to
0.30 percent in 1994/5.8
Properly designed benefit taxation does not suffer from the disadvantages of service
charges. It is generally levied on landowners, who cannot usually be considered as part
of the poor. Also, because it is designed to still leave the landowners with an overall
benefit from the project, it does not discourage their participation. This suggests that
benefit taxation could be applied more widely to the financing of urban infrastructure
projects.
4 The theoretical basis of reforms
The purpose of this section is to examine the theoretical basis of the reforms discussed
above. While all the main issues are covered here, the analysis of several issues involves
questioning whether the assumptions that lie behind the policy recommendations are
appropriate to developing countries.
A large part of tax theory for developed countries rests on two fundamental
assumptions. First, it is generally assumed that the economy would produce an efficient
(Pareto optimal) allocation of resources in the absence of distortionary taxes. Second, it
is typically assumed that there is a large variety of tax instruments available to the
government: specifically, taxes on all transactions and direct payments to households
(which can be combined to produce the equivalent of progressive income taxes). Under
these assumptions, the standard tax reform recommendations are straightforward to
justify. The idea that the pre-tax economy is efficient leads naturally to the goal of tax
neutrality. The avoidance of taxes on international trade follows from the desirability of
production efficiency. Also, the assumed availability of direct payments to households
means that one does not have to worry about the distributional consequences of uniform
sales taxes. Strictly speaking, even these assumptions do not lead automatically to the
desirability of uniform commodity taxes. Differences in the degree of complementarity
between individual goods and leisure lead to non-uniform optimal commodity taxes.
However, the welfare loss of neglecting such optimal non-uniformities is very small,
provided that the direct payments are set at optimal levels. The basis of these arguments
for developed countries is explained more fully in Heady (1993) and will not be
repeated here. Instead, the analysis will concentrate on the extent to which these results
apply to low-income countries.
The issue of whether the tax neutrality recommendations are appropriate to developing
countries depends crucially on whether the assumptions of developed country tax theory
are appropriate to developing countries. In some respects they are clearly inappropriate.
Some countries are unable to administer direct payments to households. Many countries
have even greater restrictions on their tax powers: the nature of peasant agriculture
frequently makes it impossible to tax many agricultural transactions. It is therefore
necessary to use a theory of restricted taxation in evaluating tax policy for developing
countries. Tax restrictions are not the only special feature of developing countries. The
prevalence of market failures, particularly in labour and capital markets, is much greater
than in developed countries. These market failures mean that the pre-tax economy is not
efficient, that resources need to be re-allocated and that tax neutrality is not necessarily
a desirable aim.9
However, the mere recital of false assumptions is not sufficient to discredit policy
advice. The critics must show that altered assumptions lead to altered conclusions, and
ones that are sufficiently different to justify the additional administrative costs that
would frequently be implied. We shall therefore look in turn at the consequences for
policy of allowing for difficulties in administering direct payments, tax restrictions and
market failures. Issues related to income taxation are then discussed. Finally, land
taxation is considered as a way of raising revenue in the face of these difficulties.
4.1 The inability to administer direct payments
The possible inability of governments in low-income countries to make optimal direct
payments to households has important implications for the desirability of uniform sales
taxes. The standard argument for sales tax uniformity is based partly on its efficiency
properties of not distorting consumer choice and partly on the observation that direct
payments to households are usually superior on distributional grounds to consumer
price subsidies (or lower rates of tax). The intuition behind this result is that richer
people will consume more of the subsidised (or lightly taxed) goods and therefore
benefit more from the policy than poorer people. The direct payment is better because it
will at least give everybody the same benefit, and can sometimes be tailored to target
particularly vulnerable demographic groups.
This argument is analysed in the practical context of tax reform in the Czech Republic
by Heady and Smith (1995). They show that the distributional benefits of applying a
lower rate of VAT (5% instead of the standard 23%) could have been achieved by
imposing the standard rate on all goods and services, and using the resulting extra
revenue to increase personal income tax allowances and three state benefits: pensions,
child benefit and unemployment benefit. However, this alternative approach did result
in an increase in the overall marginal tax rate (income tax, social security contributions,
sales taxes and benefit withdrawals) of between 1 and 3 percentage points, depending
on household income. Such an increase could discourage labour supply. This contrasts
with the theoretical result of Deaton and Stern (1986), who show that direct payments
can be designed to achieve the distributional goals without increasing the distortion of
labour supply. The difference between theory and practice probably arises because of
the limited range of direct subsidies in use in the Czech Republic.
The applicability of the uniformity result clearly depends on the government's ability to
administer direct payments, and it can be argued that many countries lack the
administrative capacity to identify the recipients and prevent fraud. Thus, this is an
example of a case where the specific circumstances of a low-income country may
prevent a standard public finance result from being directly applicable. However, this
does not mean that the theoretical result has no significance for low-income countries.
Some countries may be able to administer direct payments or operate anti-poverty
programmes such as food-for-work. For those that cannot, the result points to the need
to target consumer subsidies as well as possible. Subsidies should be applied to specific
goods with a low, or even negative, income elasticity of demand. More general
subsidies or low VAT rates, such as those applied to food, may fail to achieve much
redistribution because of limited differences in consumption patterns between the rich
and the poor across broad categories of goods.10
The importance of direct payments is illustrated by Siqueira’s (1995) results from
calculating optimal sales tax rates for Brazil. She contrasts the case where there is a
uniform direct payment to all households with the case where such a payment is not
possible. Even the uniform payment to all households does not produce uniform sales
taxes, because the rural population has different consumption patterns from urban
inhabitants. As the rural population is poorer, and the direct payment is not
differentiated between sectors, differential sales taxation still has redistributive power.4
However, without the direct payment, sales tax rates become much more differentiated,
and the optimal tax on food is negative, and very large if there is any serious aversion
income inequality. If it had been possible to disaggregate the food category within the
model, it is certain that this subsidy would be focussed on a small number of food items
of particular importance to the poor.
Thus an inability to implement direct payments to households means that reduced rates
of tax, or even subsidies, on particular goods can be justified by concern for the poor.
This is recognised to some extent by the common practice of exempting some foods
from commodity taxation. However, it is possible that better targeting could be achieved
by special treatment of particular foods or other items consumed heavily by the poor.
The possibilities will vary from country to country, depending on the differences in
patterns of expenditure by income class.
4.2 Other restrictions on taxation
The consequences of further restrictions on taxation have been the subject of
considerable study. In the context of many developing countries, the most important tax
restriction is the difficulty in taxing trades within agriculture. Such a tax restriction
destroys the logic behind the standard production efficiency result, because producer
prices can no longer be manipulated to ensure production efficiency without a direct
effect on consumer prices and hence welfare. Stiglitz and Dasgupta (1971) and Heady
and Mitra (1982) show that commodity tax restrictions result in a divergence between
domestic market prices and shadow prices (the prices at which public sector activities
should be valued). However, shadow prices should still equal international prices for
traded goods in which the country has no monopoly power. These two results imply that
domestic market prices and international prices should diverge: there should be trade
taxes or subsidies on agricultural inputs and outputs. In other words, an inability to tax
agricultural transactions directly leads to the desirability of taxing agriculture through
its trades with the rest of the world.
The next question is whether these theoretically optimal trade taxes are of any
significant size. Heady and Mitra (1987) have used numerical models based on data
from Turkey to investigate this issue. It was found that modest but significant trade
taxes were optimal for a range of plausible parameter values. However, this did not
mean that the high rates of trade taxes that are often observed can be justified by these
arguments.
4 This does not contradict the Deaton-Stern result, as the optimal direct payments in this case would
have different for rural and urban households. Instead, it illustrates the consequences of an inability to
set the direct payments at their optimal levels.11
Of course, the effect of tax restrictions is not limited to the agricultural sector or trade
taxes. The informal sector is always hard to tax, as discussed in DFID (2001). Also, tax
restrictions can affect other domestic taxes. Siqueira (1995) demonstrates the effects of
being unable to tax or subsidise food in Brazil. This restriction could arise as a result of
the inability to tax trades within the agricultural sector, combined with the difficulty of
maintaining different food prices in rural and urban areas. The effect of this restriction
is to lower sales taxes generally, because revenue is no longer needed to finance the
food subsidy. However, there is an increase in the differences in the tax rates on
different goods, as this is the only way that the government can now redistribute
income.
4.3 Market failures
Turning to the recognition of market failures, the labour market has often been cited as a
significantly distorted market in developing countries and its relevance to tax design is
analysed by Heady (1987) and Heady and Mitra (1987). There are two types of
distortion that can be considered: (i) the fact that, in some countries, migrants from rural
areas are unable to sell the land they occupied restricts the movement of labour from
agriculture to industry, and (ii) the fact that, in many countries, the urban wage in
“modern” manufacturing is set above market clearing levels produces an incentive for
people to leave agriculture to seek urban jobs despite the existence of urban
unemployment and underemployment. Some countries may be affected by both
problems. Although the two distortions have opposite effects on migration out of rural
areas, they both lead to the conclusion that too few people are employed in the modern
manufacturing sector. This leads to the conclusion that modern sector employment
should be subsidised. The problem for tax theory is then to design taxes that will raise
the money to finance the subsidies.
In the case of distortion (i), the obvious target for taxation is agriculture because that
will encourage the movement into manufacturing. However, the difficulties of direct
taxation of agriculture have already been discussed. It therefore has to be taxed
indirectly, through taxes on its trades with other sectors, something that is not consistent
with uniform taxation and may involve the taxation of international trade. In the case of
distortion (ii), agriculture should not be taxed more than other sectors because there are
already too many people in urban areas. Indeed, it can be shown that the per capita tax
burden in agriculture should equal the average per capita tax burden in urban areas
(averaging over the formal and informal sectors, and subtracting the value of any
employment subsidy). It is therefore the people in the “informal” urban sector that
should be taxed in order to discourage further migration and subsidise formal
employment. The very nature of informal employment means that income taxes cannot
be used. The only way of taxing the informal sector is by placing particularly heavy
taxes on the sort of goods that are consumed by informal sector workers. This clearly
rules out the use of uniform sales taxes. A policy of taxing informal sector workers may
seem very inequitable, but Heady (1987) uses a numerical model to show that it can be
desirable, even for a government that is concerned about inequality. The real difficulty
is identifying the goods to tax and enforcing them.12
4.4 Income taxation
The policy direction of moving to broad bases and lower tax rates for income taxes on
both individuals and companies has already been mentioned in section 3, and there is no
research that suggests this is not suitable for developing countries, provided the changes
are designed in such a way as to avoid revenue loss. If anything, the large opportunities
for tax evasion in developing countries suggests that income tax rates should be lower
than in the developed world.5 Also, many developing countries have very narrow tax
bases, with large numbers of exemptions, many of which have been designed to protect
the interests of powerful groups. In these circumstances, base broadening can have the
triple advantages of raising revenue, improving economic efficiency and achieving
greater redistribution. As with developed countries, administrative ease and theory point
in the same direction as far as the rate structure of personal income tax is concerned: a
single rate of income tax with a high exemption level will be administratively feasible
(by reducing the number of tax payers and allowing withholding at source) and achieve
even more redistribution than an income tax system with sharply increasing marginal
rates.
Many developing countries have different rates of corporate income tax for different
sectors.6 These are typically a legacy from a period when the government’s role in the
allocation of resources was more significant. They distort the market mechanism and
increase administrative and compliance costs without producing any improvement in
revenue collection or income distribution. Their removal is a prime example of a
situation where tax simplification can do nothing but good.
Many countries also apply different rates of corporate income tax to companies of
different size. These have more justification than sectoral differences as they are often
designed to compensate for disadvantages that small businesses suffer, in terms of tax
compliance costs and poorer access to capital markets. However, they can distort
competition between large and small firms and provide incentives for firms to split into
smaller units in order to benefit from the lower taxes. It would therefore be better if
simplified tax procedures and moves to improve capital markets tackled these
disadvantages more directly.
Despite these widely accepted advantages of broad tax bases and low tax rates, there is
still the argument that income taxes need to be adapted to take account of the market
imperfections in low-income countries. Perhaps the most powerful argument is that
company taxation should be designed to provide incentives for inward foreign direct
investment (FDI). Such FDI could contribute to the increase in productivity by
introducing modern machinery and providing skills to a currently poorly trained
workforce.
5 This does not imply that the governments should not take other actions to improve tax compliance,
such as the strengthening of tax administrations and improvements in government performance that
increase its legitimacy and convince the taxpayer that they will receive something in return.
6 Tanzi and Zee (2000) report such differential rates in Egypt, Paraguay, Vietnam and Zambia.13
The issues here are complex and cannot be discussed in full in the confines of this
paper, but an outline of the relevant considerations can be sketched. A more detailed
analysis of the case for granting tax incentives to FDI, and the advantages and
disadvantages of alternative incentive mechanisms, is provided in OECD (2001). The
first point to bear in mind is that tax is only one of a large number of factors that
multinational firms take into account in deciding where to invest. What is more, as
many of the tax incentives relate to company income tax, tax only becomes an issue if
the other factors are sufficiently positive for the firm to expect the project to be
profitable. As a result of this complex of considerations, it has often been argued that
tax incentives for FDI are relatively ineffective. However, recent evidence suggests that
tax incentives can have a noticeable effect on the location of investment, especially
between locations that are similar in other respects.
There is, therefore, growing support for the idea that tax incentives can be effective in
attracting FDI. However, there is also recognition of the fact that neighbouring
countries, which may often offer similar non-tax attractions, could compete against each
other in offering tax incentives in a way which provided a benefit to the investor
without increasing the total amount of FDI allocated to the region. Despite this risk,
many countries do offer tax incentives to FDI in such forms as tax holidays, accelerated
depreciation or investment tax credits. The question that countries have to answer is
whether the additional investment created by such incentives is really worth the revenue
forgone from investments that would have been made without the incentives. This is
often very difficult to judge, and the answers are likely to vary from country to country.
4.5 Taxation of land
Given the difficulty of taxing trades in agriculture, taxation of land could be seen as a
natural alternative. Indeed, land taxation is particularly attractive in many developing
countries because ownership is often strongly concentrated amongst the rich, especially
in ‘settler economies’ such as Zimbabwe. In addition, from a theoretical point of view,
land is in fixed supply and so the incidence of the tax will be on the landowner and the
tax will not generate an excess burden. Against this, there is the argument that land
taxes increase the risk of landowners, as the tax is certain while the revenue is not. This
suggests that an output tax might be preferable, or at least should be used in conjunction
with a land tax. This is certainly a good idea if output taxation is feasible, but the
discussion above suggests that it may often not be.
Despite these theoretical advantages, there are technical and political difficulties in taxing
land. The technical difficulties arise from variations in land quality and from making sure
that the right person pays the tax. For a land tax to be horizontally equitable, the tax should
be paid by the landowner and depend not only on the land area but also on its value. The
first issue can arise when land is rented on long leases. In such cases, the levying of tax on
the occupier of land (which is usually administratively easiest) will result in the tax being
borne by a (possibly poor) tenant rather than the landowner until the lease can be
renegotiated. The second issue can cause serious measurement problems, especially when
there is not a well-developed land market. However, some countries do have yield data for
agricultural land that is used in tax assessments.
Nonetheless, problems can arise even in these countries. For example, the agricultural tax
in China makes use of the records of grain yields from each plot of land. The difficulty14
arises because some land near cities has been switched from grain production to market
gardening. This has increased the profitability of the land, arising from a natural locational
advantage (transport problems prevent farmers further from the cities from taking up the
cultivation of these more perishable crops). In theory, this should lead to an increase in the
tax on the land used for market gardening, but the use of grain yields as a measure of
quality prevents this from happening and generates considerable horizontal inequality.
Another technical difficulty arises from the possibility of land improvement, resulting from
investment by the landowner. As such improvements are not inelastically supplied, it can
be argued that they should be excluded from the land tax in order to avoid discouraging an
activity that contributes towards economic growth. If it were excluded, the base of the land
tax would be “unimproved land”. This, however, leads to three other problems. First, it is
hard to be absolutely clear about the point at which land changes from being “unimproved”
to being “improved”. Second, the time at which some pieces of land became improved will
be many years ago, and it can be difficult to obtain records on what its productivity then
was. Third, rich people could invest in land that has been greatly improved, thus
minimising their tax burden and creating apparent horizontal inequity.7
Political opposition that uses the technical problems, and the apparent inequities that they
produce, to discredit the tax, compound these difficulties. This political opposition was
mentioned in section 3, in relation to the use of service charges and benefit taxation to
provide an alternative source of revenue for local governments. This is a particular
problem with land taxes because they are a relatively visible form of taxation, and they are
aimed to a large extent at the rich and powerful. These difficulties are not confined to low-
income countries. The proportion of revenue raised by property taxes (including land
taxes) in the OECD has fallen over recent years. Nonetheless, it still appears to be higher in
OECD countries than in low-income countries.8 Also, there is a considerable range of
property tax revenues in developed countries, which shows that land tax can raise
substantial revenues if it is well designed and if political opposition is well handled. Low-
income countries, therefore, should give serious thought to raising more revenue in this
way, especially in view of the difficulties of raising other tax revenues.
5 Conclusions
This discussion of tax theory shows that there are sound reasons for much of the tax reform
advice that is given but it provides rather little support for the policy of full tax neutrality
that is frequently recommended for developing countries. This is not to say that developing
countries that ignore such recommendations are following optimal policies, or even that
they are following policies that are better than the recommended tax neutrality. What it
does imply is that countries might be able to do better than the tax neutrality policy with a
carefully designed policy that included non-uniform sales taxes and modest trade taxes.
Such a carefully designed policy needs accurate and up-to-date data for its formulation,
and this is always a problem for developing countries. At a minimum, it requires data on
7 However, this could encourage rich landowners to sell land they do not value so highly, thus
increasing the amount of land available for the rest of society.
8 It is only possible to say “appears” because the data from low-income countries usually does not
include revenue of local governments and so may miss some property tax revenue.15
household income sources and consumption patterns in order to analyse the effects of
policy changes on income distribution, and an input-output table in order to examine how
price changes might spread across the economy. Many low-income countries do not have
such data, but the costs of obtaining them may well be quite modest in comparison to the
social benefits of a better tax system.
Meanwhile, it could be argued that with a lack of data, the sensible policy is to follow tax
neutrality. The answer to this will clearly depend on the nature of data availability in each
country. A sensible policy also needs to be administratively and politically feasible, and
this point is often used as an argument for tax neutrality. For example, it would obviously
be impractical to have a large number of different commodity tax rates, especially if VAT
is being used. However, well-targeted non-uniformities in taxes could well be practicable.
Also, there is no administrative argument against trade taxes: their ease of administration is
the main explanation of their current widespread use (as well as their politically desirable,
but usually economically costly, protective effect on domestic industries).
More serious, perhaps, are the political economy arguments against tax non-uniformity.
While a limited number of uniformities might be possible to administer, they can give rise
to considerable lobbying and litigation from firms that want their products to benefit from
lower tax rates. In Pakistan, this has been a serious consequence of their differentiated
sales tax regime.
A broader political economy argument relates to the freedom that governments can be
given in setting tax rates. If governments really have the interests of their citizens at heart,
giving them the power to set differentiated tax rates could result in improved growth and
poverty alleviation. However, if the government is under the control of special interest
groups, it could abuse the tax system to help its friends, rather than the country as a whole.
In such a situation, it might be better to have a constitutional provision restricting the
government’s power to set differentiated taxes. More positively, the strengthening of
democratic institutions, the rule of law and the reduction of corruption would all contribute
to a situation where the tax system could be used to its fullest extent in the pursuit of
economic growth and the reduction of poverty.16
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